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Available online 12 October 2016AbstractThe helideck structure must satisfy the safety requirements associated with various environmental and accidental loads. Especially, there have
been a number of fire accidents offshore due to helicopter collision (take-off and/or landing) in recent decades. To prevent further accidents, a
substantial amount of effort has been directed toward the management of fire in the safety design of offshore helidecks. The aims of this study
are to introduce and apply a procedure for quantitative risk assessment and management of fires by defining the fire loads with an applied
example. The frequency of helicopter accidents are considered, and design accidental levels are applied. The proposed procedures for deter-
mining design fire loads can be efficiently applied in offshore helideck development projects.
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Helicopters are the primary modes of transport for offshore
platforms. They carry people, equipment and necessities to
offshore installations. Unlike other transport, such as ships,
helicopters take off and land on offshore installations. The
offshore structures can therefore be damaged by helicopter
accidents.
Many helicopter accidents (referred to as heli-accidents in
this paper) have been reported over the last ten years (OGP,
2010a). Fig. 1 shows examples of heli-accidents on offshore
platforms.
The frequency of heli-accidents is lower than for other
events (explosions, fires, collisions or dropped objects), but
they do also have the potential risk factor of fires, as* Corresponding author.
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are always present in helicopters.
If a heli-accident occurs on a helideck, fuel can leak from
the tank. Released fuel can cause a pool fire, which can
structurally damage the helideck.
API (2006) and DNV (2001) recommend that fire safety
facilities such as fire extinguishers, water sprays, fire resistant
equipment, etc. are installed to prevent such structural dam-
age. Also, SOLAS (2015) suggests the fire-fighting appliances
regarding categories in Regulation 18 (Helicopter facilities).
There are, however, only recommendations for fire sup-
pression facilities in the rules and standards, and the guidelines
for structural safety designs to fire fighting and the definition
of design fire loads are weak.
In particular, a helideck made from aluminum is sensitive
to temperature and heat flux, compared with other materials
such as carbon steel, stainless steel, nickel alloy, etc. A
structural design for aluminum helidecks that specifically ad-
dresses the risk of fires is therefore necessary and should be
developed.Society of Naval Architects of Korea. This is an open access article under the
Nomenclature
FFire Fire frequency
FRelease Leak frequency
PIgnition Ignition probability
a Scale factor of Weibull distribution
b Shape factor of Weibull distribution
m Mean of normal distribution
s Standard deviation of normal distribution
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assessment and management of topside structures on offshore
installations (Spouge, 1999; Vinnem, 2007; Paik and Czujko,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Paik et al., 2013). In addition,
structural safety assessment of topside structure considering
fire accidents is performed by Yanlin and Jang (2015). In spiteFig. 1. Heli-accidents on West Navion (
Fig. 2. A procedure for quantitative risk aof these efforts, different approach for helidecks is needed
(Vinnem, 2007).
The aims of this study are to (i) introduce and (ii) apply a
procedure for quantitative fire risk assessment and manage-
ment for helidecks on offshore installations, and to (iii) define
the design fire loads for helicopter collisions on helidecks,
with applied examples.
In the present study, credible fire scenarios are selected in the
procedure, and a reasonable accident acceptance level for hel-
idecks is suggested, to help define design fire loads to ensure the
structural safety of aluminum helidecks in case of fires.
2. A procedure for quantitative fire risk assessment and
management
Unlike the prescriptive procedures associated with rules,
standards or qualitative risk assessment and management (Paikleft, 2001) and Araon (right, 2013).
ssessment and management for fires.
Table 2
Probability of wind direction and speed in the ocean of West Africa.
Wind direction () Probability (%) Wind speed (m/s) Probability (%)
0e45 2.137 0e2 9.508
45e90 1.501 2e4 33.831
90e135 8.101 4e6 40.270
135e180 38.775 6e8 14.870
180e225 33.628 8e10 1.446
225e270 10.572 10e12 0.065
270e315 3.420 12e14 0.010
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Assessment and Management (QRA&M) for fires on offshore
platforms proposed by Paik et al. (2013) efficiently evaluates
risks and defines the design loads. Fig. 2 illustrates a procedure
for the quantitative risk assessment andmanagement of offshore
installations in case of fires. The procedure can be applied to the
risk assessment of helidecks, and is used in this study.
The procedure for QRA&M in fire accidents, as shown in
Fig. 2, can be divided into eight steps, described in detail in
Table 1. In application of risk acceptance criteria, As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) risks such as fire loads,
structural response, etc. can be adopted.
In this study, steps 1e5 (not the entire procedure) are
carried out to obtain a fire exceedance curve, which can define
the design fire loads of helidecks.Table 1
Details of the procedure for quantitative fire risk assessment and management.
Steps Descriptions
1 Investigation of metocean data and functional requirements of target
structure
2 Selection of credible fire scenarios with metocean and operation-
related parameters using a probabilistic approach
3 Obtaining fire loads (temperature, heat flux, etc.) of each fire scenario
by experiment and/or computational fluid dynamics (CFD)
4 Calculation of fire accident frequencies of fire scenarios using
historical data
5 Generation of fire (temperature, heat flux, flame length, etc.)
exceedance curves with fire loads and frequencies, and determination
of design fire loads
6 Conducting structural consequence response analysis by the nonlinear
finite element method and/or experiment, and investigating the
consequences of fire accidents
7 Calculation of fire risk [risk ¼ frequency  consequence]
8 Decision making (redesign of the structure or adoption of risk control
options)
Fig. 3. Probability of wind direction (wind rose) in the ocean of West Africa
from the south (Paik and Czujko, 2010).The partial procedure carried out applies a (i) probabilistic
method to select scenarios, (ii) computational fluid dynamics
(CFD) to obtain fire loads and (iii) historical data to calculate
the fire frequency.315e360 1.871 14þ 0.005
Total 100.005 Total 100.005
Fig. 4. Probability density distribution of wind direction.
Fig. 5. Probability density distribution of wind speed.
Table 3
Helicopter information used in the examination of
offshore installations.
Capacity of fuel tank (L) 2877
Mileage (km/L) 0.35
Density of fuel (kg/L) 0.811
Fig. 6. Location and distance of offshore installations from the nearest land (left: the ocean of Brazil, right: West Africa).
Table 4
Distance of offshore platforms from the nearest land, the minimum required
fuel and the remaining fuel.
Offshore no. Shortest
distance
from land
(km)
Minimum
required
fuel (L)
Fuel in
tank after
landing on
offshore (L)
1 332.00 948.57 1928.43
2 322.58 921.66 1955.34
3 296.77 847.91 2029.09
4 282.76 807.89 2069.11
5 202.94 579.83 2297.17
6 180.00 514.29 2362.71
7 138.00 394.29 2482.71
8 135.71 387.74 2489.26
9 123.48 352.80 2524.20
10 123.33 352.37 2524.63
11 122.58 350.23 2526.77
12 120.00 342.86 2534.14
13 113.00 322.86 2554.14
14 111.29 317.97 2559.03
15 110.00 314.29 2562.71
16 108.00 308.57 2568.43
17 106.00 302.86 2574.14
18 93.00 265.71 2611.29
19 88.24 252.11 2624.89
20 87.10 248.86 2628.14
21 84.38 241.09 2635.91
22 81.67 233.34 2643.66
23 60.00 171.43 2705.57
24 53.33 152.37 2724.63
25 45.00 128.57 2748.43
26 40.00 114.29 2762.71
Table 5
Probability of practicable leak amount.
Leak amount (L) Leak amount (kg) Probability (%)
1849.57e1972.87 1500e1600 7.69
1972.87e2096.18 1600e1700 7.69
2096.18e2219.48 1700e1800 0.00
2219.48e2342.79 1800e1900 3.85
2342.79e2466.09 1900e2000 3.85
2466.09e2589.40 2000e2100 42.31
2589.40e2712.70 2100e2200 23.08
2712.70e2836.00 2200e2300 11.54
Total 100.00
Table 6
Re-categorized index of leak amount for probability density distribution.
Index Leak amount (kg) Probability (%)
0e1 1700e1800 0.00
1e2 1800e1900 3.85
2e3 1500e1600 7.69
3e4 2100e2200 23.08
4e5 2000e2100 42.31
5e6 2200e2300 11.54
6e7 1600e1700 7.69
7e8 1900e2000 3.88
Total 100.00
Fig. 7. Probability density distribution of index for amount of released fuel.
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When selecting credible fire accident scenarios, all possible
parameters that can have an effect on fire loads should be
considered, such as temperature, heat flux, flame length, etc.
Fires can also be affected by wind (direction and speed) and
leak (rate, direction, duration and position).
In the case of a jet fire, the scenarios should take into ac-
count the leak rate, direction, duration and position associated
with the release. The characteristics of a pool fire, however,
mean that only the operation parameters of leak amount and
position are required.
Fig. 8. Divided, numbered sections for selection of the leak position on a
regular octagon helideck.
Table 7
Area and probability of sections.
No. Area (a2) Probability (%) No. Area (a2) Probability (%)
1 0.250 1.294 17 1.000 5.178
2 0.250 1.294 18 1.000 5.178
3 0.250 1.294 19 0.707 3.661
4 0.250 1.294 20 0.707 3.661
5 0.500 2.589 21 0.707 3.661
6 0.500 2.589 22 0.707 3.661
7 0.707 3.661 23 0.707 3.661
8 0.707 3.661 24 0.707 3.661
9 0.707 3.661 25 0.707 3.661
10 0.707 3.661 26 0.707 3.661
11 0.707 3.661 27 0.500 2.589
12 0.707 3.661 28 0.500 2.589
13 0.707 3.661 29 0.250 1.294
14 0.707 3.661 30 0.250 1.294
15 1.000 5.178 31 0.250 1.294
16 1.000 5.178 32 0.250 1.294
Total 19.314 100.000
Fig. 9. Probability density distribution of leak position (section number).
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wind speed, (iii) leak amount and (iv) leak position are
considered when selecting the scenarios, as fires caused by
heli-accidents are similar to pool fires.3.1. Wind direction and speedUnlike ships that travel around the world, offshore plat-
forms operate in a fixed, specific location. The metocean
characteristics of the specific ocean can therefore be used for
the risk assessment of offshore helidecks.
Fig. 3 and Table 2 present the wind direction (wind rose)
and the metocean data, which in this applied example are the
probability of wind direction and speed in the ocean of West
Africa.
As the original (raw) data are discontinuous, they must be
converted to continuous functions so that a probabilistic
approach can be used. Best-fit analysis should be conducted
before the probability density function (PDF) is defined.Fig. 10. Scheme of the Latin Hypercube sampling technique (Ye, 1998).
Fig. 11. Method for selecting the representative value of the random variable
for each parameter.
524 S.J. Kim et al. / International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 8 (2016) 519e529Figs. 4e5 show the PDFs of wind direction and speed. The
best-fitted function for wind direction is normal distribution,
and for speed is Weibull distribution.3.2. Leak amountCalculating a leak amount is difficult, as helicopter acci-
dents on offshore platforms are extremely rare, and the ca-
pacities of helicopter fuel tanks and engines are all different.Table 8
Selected fire scenarios on helidecks.
Scenario
no.
Wind
direction
()
Wind
speed
(m/s)
Leak
amount
(kg)
Leak
position
(section no.)
1 237.975 6.219 2129.880 18
2 255.749 2.636 2084.500 25
3 211.951 4.630 2146.910 3
4 187.294 2.977 2046.570 10
5 118.887 3.083 2065.200 12
6 218.334 2.243 2162.340 23
7 182.203 3.288 1556.610 7
8 140.139 5.263 2071.540 20
9 184.744 2.513 2219.840 14
10 155.847 1.738 1842.790 24
11 123.955 6.056 2077.960 21
12 106.260 0.758 2205.040 10
13 172.008 7.929 2183.510 1
14 189.860 4.832 2021.980 4
15 206.029 3.388 1638.110 14
16 59.249 2.382 2190.190 27
17 97.668 5.904 2091.170 21
18 221.756 4.149 2227.710 19
19 215.074 5.151 1601.130 30
20 158.678 4.339 1587.180 17
21 113.104 3.773 2120.540 8
22 161.440 1.926 1506.490 23
23 174.574 6.399 2028.150 22
24 276.660 6.829 2052.730 17
25 200.436 3.582 2034.290 22
26 195.070 5.380 2287.220 13
27 225.376 2.868 2235.960 20
28 85.563 5.502 2040.420 19
29 169.419 8.991 2169.620 26
30 179.666 4.532 2138.640 12
31 143.556 3.961 2275.010 6
32 197.730 3.867 2196.740 12
33 192.450 4.730 1573.180 13
34 166.800 5.042 1923.560 8
35 264.405 6.599 1666.840 18
36 233.411 1.517 2009.510 9
37 243.060 3.678 2244.690 16
38 208.941 7.101 2098.010 11
39 164.144 4.244 2212.310 15
40 177.124 2.754 1617.560 11
41 146.810 3.187 2254.000 18
42 149.930 1.234 1599.450 15
43 128.505 3.485 2058.940 5
44 203.198 7.443 2110.470 13
45 248.867 4.935 2003.170 19
46 302.975 5.762 2154.790 16
47 152.936 5.628 2264.040 9
48 229.241 4.055 1535.800 16
49 136.523 2.092 2015.770 15
50 132.665 4.435 2176.660 28Several assumptions (type of helicopter and/or fuel, the loca-
tion of the offshore platforms, the amount of fuel in the tank,
etc.) must therefore be made.
Two assumptions are made in this study: first, that one type
of fuel is used in the helicopters, and two, that they have a full
fuel condition when they depart from land.
The leak amounts given in the study are calculated using
the following steps:
1) Definition of helicopter (type of fuel)
2) Investigation of helicopter characteristics (capacity of fuel
tank, mileage, etc.)
3) Definition of fuel condition on the land (a full condition is
assumed)
4) Calculation of the distance between the land and the
offshore installation
5) Calculation of the minimum required fuel from the land to
the offshore installation
6) Calculation of the remaining fuel in the helicopter, which
will be the leak amount
To obtain the leak amount, a helicopter with JP-8 fuel type,
which is generally used in offshore installations, is assumed.
The specifications of the helicopter are given in Table 3.
To investigate the air-line distance between the land and
offshore installations, the ocean regions of Brazil and West
Africa, where many platforms are installed, are considered.Table 9
Gas compositions of the JP-8 fuel type.
Component Mole fraction (%)
Dodecane (C12H26) 31.58
Tetradecane (C14H30) 23.64
Decane (C10H22) 22.53
Hexadecane (C16H34) 17.12
Isooctane (C8H18) 5.13
Total 100.00
Fig. 12. Target structure, extent of analysis and applied grids in KFX CFD
simulations.
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Brazil and West Africa, and the shortest radius from offshore
to land, as the shortest distance is generally preferred.
After investigating the distance from the land in Fig. 6, the
minimum amount of fuel required to the platforms, and the
remaining amount of fuel when the helicopter arrives at the
platforms can be calculated. These are shown in Table 4. The
remaining fuel is then considered as the leak amount.
Table 5 shows the probability of the leak amount. It is
difficult to make a PDF (normal, Weibull distribution function,
etc.), so it is re-categorized, as shown in Table 6, to generate
the normal distribution function.
Fig. 7 illustrates the histogram and PDF of the re-
categorized leak amount, used to select fire scenarios.3.3. Leak positionThe leak position in the topside structure is relevant to
processing units such as pipes, equipment, vessels, etc., and
the crash areas are considered as leak positions on the heli-
deck. However, this area cannot be exactly defined due to the
small amount of historical data available.
It is therefore assumed that helicopter accidents on heli-
decks of offshore platforms occur evenly across the entire
helideck. Fig. 8 presents a regular octagon helideck, applied as
the target structure in this study, and divided into areas so the
histogram and PDF can be obtained.Fig. 13. Location of numbered monitorTable 7 and Fig. 9 show the probability of each section, a
histogram and the normal distribution function of the leak
positions.3.4. Selection of fire scenariosVarious sampling methods, such asMonte Carlo Simulations
(MSC) (Rubinstein, 1981), standard random sampling
(Rubinstein, 1981), stratified sampling (Czujko, 2001), Latin
Hypercube Sampling (LHS) (Ye, 1998), etc. are used for
selecting the scenarios. Of these sampling techniques, LHS can
efficiently reduce the number of scenarios and have an accuracy
with a number of scenarios less than MSC (Czujko, 2001).
Figs. 10 and 11 present the scheme of the LHS technique
and the method for defining the representative value.
In the study, using the Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS)
technique, 50 fire scenarios are selected with PDFs (wind di-
rection, wind speed, leak amount and leak position), as shown
in Table 8 for an applied example. The center of each section
is defined as a leak position.
4. Fire CFD simulations4.1. Modeling of fire CFD simulationsTo obtain the fire loads, the Kameleon FireEX (KFX, 2014)
CFD tool is used. KFX generates control volumes (grids)ing points to investigate fire loads.
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and/or the leak hole size. Fig. 12 shows the target structure,
which is the helideck, the extent of analysis and the applied
grids in KFX. The total number of control volumes is
1,800,000.
As mentioned in Section of Leak amount, it is assumed that
one type of helicopter fuel (JP-8) is used. Table 9 shows the
gas compositions of the JP-8 fuel type.4.2. Obtaining the fire loadsKFX provides the fire loads at 1000 monitoring points. In
this study, 96 points are used to obtain the fire loads.
The fire loads, such as temperature, heat flux, flame length,
etc. differ according to the height from the heat source. Three
elevations (0.05, 0.50 and 1.00 m from the heat source) are
therefore selected to investigate the fire loads.
Fig. 13 illustrates the location of monitoring points at three
elevations (Fig. 13(a)). A point is located at the geometric
center of each section.4.3. Results of fire CFD simulationsFig. 14. Examples of results of fire simulations.Fig. 14 shows examples of the simulation results. Fig. 14(a)
presents the temperature of scenario 15 at three elevations.
The temperature at the elevation nearest to the heat source is
higher than the others.
Scenario 39, as presented in Fig. 14(b), has a pool fire at
section 15 (shown in Fig. 8 and Table 8). In the first 30 s after
ignition, the temperature at point 71 is very high compared
with the other points, but then reduces and is similar to that at
monitoring point 77. This is due to the effect of wind at both
points.
Fig. 15 illustrates the effect of the variables wind direction,
wind speed, and leak amount on the maximum temperature of
the entire monitoring region. It shows that the wind speed has
a remarkable effect on the fire loads, compared with other
variables. With a wind speed of over 6 m/s, the temperature is
similar to room temperature.
5. Calculation of fire frequency
To generate a fire exceedance curve, both fire load and fire
frequency are required. The fire frequency can be calculated
by Eq. (1).
FFire ¼ FRelease  PIgnition ð1Þ
where, FFire ¼ fire frequency, FRelease ¼ leak frequency and
PIgnition ¼ ignition probability.5.1. Leak (accidental) frequencyOGP (2010a) provides historical data of heli-accidents on
offshore platforms. Table 10 presents the frequency of heli-
accidents according to areas. In the present study, fre-
quencies of phase in take-off and landing are considered, as aleak from a heli-accident can occur during either. A fuel
release is assumed for all accidents.
For comparison, frequencies in the North Sea and in the
Gulf of Mexico (GOM) are applied. Therefore, the resulting
frequencies of 8.6E-9/yr (4.3E-7/(yr$50), North Sea) and
5.4E-8/yr (2.7E-6/(yr$50), GOM) are equally used for leak
(accidental) frequency in each fire scenario.5.2. Ignition probabilityThe probability of ignition for fires from helicopter acci-
dents has not been sufficiently investigated, but in this study
it must be taken into account, so the ‘offshore FPSO liquid
model’ suggested by OGP (2010b) is adopted. This model
Fig. 15. Effect of variables for fire on maximum temperatures.
Table 10
Offshore helicopter transport flight accident frequency for the risk estimation
model (OGP, 2010a).
Region Flight phase Frequency (/yr) Unit
North sea In-flight 8.5E-6 per flight hour
Take-off & landing 4.3E-7 per flight stage
Gulf of Mexico
(GOM)
In-flight 8.5E-6 per flight hour
Take-off & landing 2.7E-6 per flight stage
Rest of world In-flight 8.5E-6 per flight hour
Take-off & landing 2.7E-6 per flight stage
Fig. 16. Ignition probability relevant to release rate (OGP, 2010b).
527S.J. Kim et al. / International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 8 (2016) 519e529can be applied to the release of flammable liquids that do not
have any significant flash fraction (10% or less) within
offshore process modules or decks on FPSOs (OGP, 2010b).
Fig. 16 presents the ignition probability according to the leak
rate.
If an accident occurs, the fuel spills out of the tank in a very
short time, so the total leak amount is considered as the release
rate, shown in Fig. 16, to calculate the ignition probability.
From Fig. 16, 0.028 of initiation probability is used for all 50
fire scenarios.
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Table 12
Defined design fire loads for helideck with 108/yr risk accepted level (C).
Elevation A Elevation B Elevation C
North Sea 20.3 20.1 20.0
GOM 954.8 264.6 166.8As shown in Eq. (1), fire frequency is calculated by leak
frequency and ignition probability. Table 11 shows the leak
frequency, ignition probability and fire frequency of heli-
accidents in the North Sea and the GOM.
6. Design accidental loads for fires on helidecks of
offshore installations
The fire load exceedance curve can be generated from the
fire frequency and fire loads, and design accidental loads are
obtained from this curve. The maximum temperature ex-
ceedance curve is adopted to define the design accidental load.
Figs. 17e19 present the maximum temperature exceedance
curves at elevations A, B and C, which are derived from the
study.
As shown in Fig. 14(a), the temperature exceedance curve
at elevation A has the highest value, compared with that of the
air (B and C). This means that the structure, which is the
helideck, is exposed to the highest temperature in theTable 11
Leak frequency, ignition probability and fire frequency.
Leak frequency (/yr) Ignition probability Fire frequency (/yr)
North Sea GOM North Sea GOM
8.6E-9 5.4E-08 2.8E-2 2.4E-10 1.5E-9
Fig. 17. Probability exceedance curves of maximum temperature at elevation A.
Fig. 18. Probability exceedance curves of maximum temperature at elevation B.accidents. The structure should have sufficient strength to
withstand the fire loads.
Helicopter accidents in the Gulf of Mexico are more
frequent than in the North Sea. Consequently, the exceedance
level in the GOM is almost 10 times that of the North Sea.
This suggests that a design for an offshore helideck in a spe-
cific ocean area cannot be applied to one in a different area,
and that offshore helidecks installed in the GOM need to be
stronger for safety.
Helicopter crashes on offshore platforms are rare, so the
exceedance level is very much lower than for other accidents,
such as explosions, fires, collisions, groundings, etc. (Vinnem,
2007). Different design accidental levels should therefore be
adopted for the structural designs of helidecks regarding fires.
Table 12 shows examples of the defined design fire loads for
helideck. 108/yr of risk accepted load level proposed by
Vinnem (2007) is adopted. It can be seen that the 108/yr of risk
level is practical for risk assessment against the heli-accident.
7. Conclusions
Helicopter crashes on helidecks are rare events, but there is
still a risk of helidecks being exposed to fire loads from pool
fires that result from heli-accidents. Defining design fire loads is
therefore important for safety, and structural design should take
into account design loads obtained through risk assessment.
Defining design fire loads for the safe design of helidecks
on offshore platforms is not easy, as there is insufficient his-
torical data of heli-accidents.
The aims of this study are to suggest a procedure for defining
the design fire accidental loads for aluminum helideck safety,
and to carry out a procedure with an applied example.
In the study, it is inevitable that assumptions were needed
in the selection of scenarios, and 50 credible accidental fire
(pool fire) scenarios were selected, with several assumptions,
using the Latin Hypercube sampling technique. The charac-
teristics of fire loads and temperature exceedance curves were
investigated.
529S.J. Kim et al. / International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 8 (2016) 519e529The conclusions of this study are as follows:
- The temperature at elevation A (structure), the nearest
elevation to the heat source, is higher than at the other
elevations.
- Helidecks of offshore platform located in the Gulf of
Mexico require stronger designs than those located in the
North Sea.
- Less than 108/yr (at the GOM) and/or 109/yr (at the
North Sea) of risk accepted load levels should be
considered when determining fire accidental loads for
aluminum safety helidecks on offshore platforms, in the
rare event of a heli-accident.
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